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Abstract
We characterize all domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof social
choice functions coincides with the set of min-max rules. As an application of our result, we
obtain a characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on maxi-
mal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally rich single-peaked
domains (Peters et al. (2014)), maximal regular single-crossing domain (Saporiti (2009)), and
distance based single-peaked domains. We further consider domains that exhibit single-peaked
property only over a subset of alternatives. We call such domains top-connected partially
single-peaked domains. We characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice
functions on such domains. As an application of this result, we obtain a characterization of
the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice functions on multiple single-peaked domains
(Reffgen (2015)), single-peaked domains on graphs, and several other domains of practical
significance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a standard social choice problem where an alternative has to be chosen based on
privately known preferences of the agents in a society. Such a procedure is known as social choice
function (SCF). Agents are strategic in the sense that they misreport their preferences whenever it is
strictly beneficial for them. An SCF is called strategy-proof if no agent can benefit by misreporting
her preferences. Moreover, an SCF is called unanimous if whenever all the agents in the society
agree on their best alternative, that alternative is chosen.
Most of the subject matter of social choice theory concerns the study of unanimous and strategy-
proof SCFs for different admissible domains of preferences. In the seminal works by Gibbard
(1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), it is shown that in a society with at least three alternatives, if
the admissible domain of preferences for each individual is unrestricted, then every unanimous
and strategy-proof SCF is dictatorial. An SCF is dictatorial if a particular individual in the
society determines the outcome regardless of the preferences of others. The celebrated Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem hinges crucially on the assumption that the admissible domain of each
individual is unrestricted. However, it is well established that there are natural restrictions on
such domains in many economic and political applications. For instance, the problem of locating
a firm in a unidimensional spatial market (Hotelling (1929)), setting the rate of carbon dioxide
emissions (Black (1948)), setting the level of public expenditure (Romer and Rosenthal (1979)),
and so on admit naturally restricted preferences widely known as single-peaked preferences. The
crucial property of a single-peaked preference is that there is a prior order over the alternatives
such that the preference decreases as one moves away (with respect to the prior order) from her
best alternative.
The study of single-peaked domains dates back to Black (1948). Moulin (1980) and Weymark
(2011) have characterized the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs defined over such a domain
as min-max rules.1,2 The characterization by Moulin (1980) and Weymark (2011) rests upon the
crucial assumption that the domain is the maximal single-peaked domain, i.e., it contains all the
single-peaked preferences with respect to a given prior order over the alternatives. However,
demanding the existence of all single-peaked preferences is a strong prerequisite in many practical
1Barbera` et al. (1993) and Ching (1997) provide equivalent presentations of this class of SCFs.
2A rich literature has developed around the single-peaked restriction by considering various generalizations and
extensions (see Barbera` et al. (1993), Demange (1982), Schummer and Vohra (2002), Nehring and Puppe (2007a), and
Nehring and Puppe (2007b)).
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situations and hence, it is justified to impose further restrictions on the maximal single-peaked
domain.3
In continuity with the above discussion, we characterize the minimal subsets of a single-peaked
domain so that every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on it is a min-max rule. Such a domain
contains 2m− 2 preferences whereas a maximal single-peaked domain contains 2m−1 preferences,
where m is the number of alternatives. We also characterize the domains for which the set of
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs coincides with the set of min-max rules. We call such a
domain a min-max domain. We show that a domain is a min-max domain if all the preferences
in it are single-peaked and it satisfies the top-connected property. Top-connectedness property
with respect to a prior order requires that for every two alternatives x and y that are adjacent
(consecutive) in that prior order, there exists a preference that places x at the top and y at the
second-ranked position.4
A regular single-crossing domain (Saporiti (2009)) is an example of a top-connected single-
peaked domain.5,6 Saporiti (2009) shows that an SCF is unanimous, anonymous, and strategy-
proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is a median rule. We extend Saporiti
(2009)’s result by relaxing the anonymity assumption on the SCF and the maximality assumption
on the domain. However, we assume the domains to be regular. In particular, we show that
an SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on a regular single-crossing domain satisfying top-
connectedness property if and only if it is a min-max rule. Note that a maximal single-crossing
domain requires m(m− 1)/2 preferences, whereas a regular single-crossing domain satisfying
top-connectedness property requires 2m− 2 preferences.
Although single-peaked domains are used to model many practical situations, several empirical
studies (Niemi and Wright (1987), Feld and Grofman (1988), Pappi and Eckstein (1998)) fail to
support the assumption that all the preferences of an agent are single-peaked. In view of this, we
3Further examples of such restricted single-peaked domains include the preference restriction considered in
models of voting (Tullock (1967), Arrow (1969)), taxation and redistribution (Epple and Romer (1991)), determining
the levels of income redistribution (Hamada (1973), Slesnick (1988)), and measuring tax reforms in the presence of
horizontal inequity (Hettich (1979)) and recently, Puppe (2015) shows that under mild conditions these domains
form subsets of maximal single-peaked domains.
4The top-connectedness property is well studied in the literature (see Barbera` and Peleg (1990), Aswal et al. (2003),
Chatterji and Sen (2011), Chatterji et al. (2014), Chatterji and Zeng (2015), and Puppe (2015)).
5A domain is regular if every alternative appears as a top in some preference in the domain.
6Single-crossing domains appear in models of taxation and redistribution (Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard
(1981)), local public goods and stratification (Westhoff (1977), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001)), coalition
formation (Demange (1994), Kung (2006)), selecting constitutional and voting rules (Barbera` and Jackson (2004)), and
designing policies in the market for higher education (Epple et al. (2006)).
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consider domains which satisfy single-peakedness only for a strict subset of alternatives. We call
such domains partially single-peaked domains. We characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof
SCFs on a class of partially single-peaked domains as partly dictatorial generalized median voter
schemes (PDGMVS). Loosely put, a PDGMVS acts like a min-max rule over the subset of the
domain where single-peakedness is satisfied and acts like a dictatorial rule everywhere else.
Our result generalizes those in Reffgen (2015). He introduces the notion of multiple single-peaked
domains and characterizes the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such domains. A multiple
single-peaked domain is a union of several maximal single-peaked domains with respect to
different prior orders over the alternatives. A plausible justification for such a domain restriction
is provided by Niemi (1969) who argues that alternatives can be ordered differently using different
criteria (which he calls an impartial culture) and it is not publicly known which individual uses
what criterion. On one extreme, such a domain becomes an unrestricted domain if there is no
consensus among the individuals on the prior order over the alternatives, and on the other
extreme, it becomes a maximal single-peaked domain if all the individuals agree on a single prior
order over the alternatives. We extend Reffgen (2015)’s result in two directions: (i) by requiring
minimum knowledge about the prior orders over the alternatives as perceived by individuals
and (ii) by requiring a minimal set of single-peaked preferences for each of these prior orders.
We further show that this class of domains contains almost all domains for which the set of
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs coincides with the set of PDGMVS. Note that a multiple
single-peaked domain with respect to k prior orders over the alternatives requires approximately
(depending on the prior orders) k× 2m−1 preferences. On the contrary, the partially single-peaked
domains that we consider require only 2m preferences.
Lastly, we consider group strategy-proofness. Barbera` et al. (2010) provides a sufficient con-
dition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness on a domain.
Top-connected single-peaked domains satisfy their condition, and hence we obtain a characteriza-
tion of unanimous and group strategy-proof SCFs on these domains as a corollary of their result.
However, our partially single-peaked domains do not satisfy their condition and consequently,
we show that strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent on these domains.
In particular, we provide a characterization of unanimous and group strategy-proof SCFs on such
domains.
We conclude this section by relating our paper to the existing literature. For every given min-
max rule, Serizawa (1995) and Barbera` et al. (1999) characterize maximal domains under which it
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is strategy-proof. However, we characterize domains where all min-max rules are strategy-proof.
Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability
of two min-max rules in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. Our results identify the
set of all min-max rules that remain strategy-proof on a domain that violate single-peakedness
around the middle of the linear order. Chatterji et al. (2013) show that if a domain admits an
anonymous (and hence non-dictatorial), tops-only, unanimous, and strategy-proof SCF, then it is
a semi-single-peaked domain. Semi-single-peaked domains violate single-peakedness around
the tails of the linear order. However, our results show that if the single-peakedness is violated
around the middle of the linear order, then there is no unanimous, strategy-proof, and anonymous
SCF. Thus, our results complement that in Chatterji et al. (2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the usual social choice framework in
Section 2. In Section 3, we study the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on the top-connected
single-peaked domains. Section 4 studies the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on a class
of partially single-peaked domains. Section 5 deals with group strategy-proofness and the last
section concludes the paper. All the omitted proofs are collected in Appendix A and Appendix B.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of at least two agents, who collectively choose an element from a finite
set X = {a, a + 1, . . . , b− 1, b} of at least three alternatives, where a is an integer. For x, y ∈ X
such that x ≤ y, we define the intervals [x, y] = {z ∈ X | x ≤ z ≤ y}, [x, y) = [x, y] \ {y},
(x, y] = [x, y] \ {x}, and (x, y) = [x, y] \ {x, y}. A preference P over X is a complete, transitive,
and asymmetric binary relation (also called a linear order) defined on X. We denote by L(X)
the set of all preferences over X. An alternative x ∈ X is called the kth ranked alternative in a
preference P ∈ L(X), denoted by rk(P), if |{a ∈ X | aPx}| = k− 1. By D ⊆ L(X), we denote
a domain of admissible preferences. An element PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ Dn is called a preference
profile. The top-set of a preference profile PN, denoted by τ(PN), is defined as τ(PN) = {x ∈ X |
r1(Pi) = x for some i ∈ N}. A domain D of preferences is regular if for all x ∈ X, there exists a
preference P ∈ D such that r1(P) = x. All the domains we consider in this paper are assumed
to be regular. For notational convenience, whenever it is clear from the context, we do not use
braces for singleton sets, i.e., we denote sets {i} by i.
Definition 2.1. A social choice function (SCF) f on Dn is a mapping f : Dn → X.
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Definition 2.2. An SCF f : Dn → X is unanimous if for all PN ∈ Dn such that r1(Pi) = x for all
i ∈ N and some x ∈ X, we have f (PN) = x.
Definition 2.3. An SCF f : Dn → X is manipulable if there exists an agent i ∈ N, a preference
profile PN ∈ Dn, and a preference P′i ∈ D such that f (P
′
i , PN\i)Pi f (PN). An SCF f is strategy-proof
if it is not manipulable.
Definition 2.4. An SCF f : Dn → X is called dictatorial if there exists an agent i ∈ N such that for
all preference profiles PN ∈ Dn, f (PN) = r1(Pi).
Definition 2.5. Two preference profiles PN, P′N are called tops-equivalent if r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) for all
i ∈ N.
Definition 2.6. An SCF f : Dn → X is called tops-only if for any two tops-equivalent preference
profiles PN, P′N ∈ Dn, f (PN) = f (P′N).
Definition 2.7. A domain D is called dictatorial if every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF
f : Dn → X is dictatorial. A domain that is not dictatorial is called a non-dictatorial domain.
Definition 2.8. A domain D is called tops-only if every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF
f : Dn → X is tops-only.
Definition 2.9. A preference P ∈ L(X) is called single-peaked if for all x, y ∈ X, [x < y ≤
r1(P) or r1(P) ≤ y < x] implies yPx. A domain S is called a single-peaked domain if each preference
in it is single-peaked, and a domain S¯ is called maximal single-peaked if it contains all single-peaked
preferences.
Definition 2.10. An SCF f : Dn → X is called uncompromising if for all PN ∈ Dn, all i ∈ N, and
all P′i ∈ D:
(i) if r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P′i ) ≤ f (PN), then f (PN) = f (P′i , P−i), and
(ii) if f (PN) < r1(Pi) and f (PN) ≤ r1(P′i ), then f (PN) = f (P′i , P−i).
REMARK 2.1. If an SCF f satisfies uncompromisingness, then by definition, f is tops-only.
Definition 2.11. Let β = (βS)S⊆N be a list of 2n parameters satisfying: (i) βS ∈ X for all S ⊆ N,
(ii) β∅ = b, βN = a, and (iii) for any S ⊆ T, βT ≤ βS. Then, an SCF f β : Dn → X is called a
min-max rule with respect to β if:
f β(P1, . . . , Pn) = min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}}.
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REMARK 2.2. Every min-max rule is uncompromising.7
Now, we introduce a few graph theoretic notions. A directed graph G is defined as a pair 〈V, E〉,
where V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V is the set of directed edges, and an undirected graph
G is defined as a pair 〈V, E〉, where V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ {{u, v} | u, v ∈ V and u 6= v}.
For two graphs (directed or undirected) G1 = 〈V1, E1〉 and G2 = 〈V2, E2〉, the graph G1 ∪ G2 is
defined as G1 ∪ G2 = 〈V1 ∪V2, E1 ∪ E2〉.
All the graphs we consider in this paper are of the kind G = 〈X, E〉, i.e., whose node set is the
set of alternatives.
Definition 2.12. A directed (undirected) graph G = 〈X, E〉 is called the directed (undirected) line
graph on X if (x, y) ∈ E ({x, y} ∈ E) if and only if |x− y| = 1.
Definition 2.13. A node-path in a directed (undirected) graph G = 〈X, E〉 from a node x to a node
y, denoted by piG(x, y), is defined as a sequence of nodes x1, . . . , xk such that x1 = x, xk = y, and
(xi, xi+1) ∈ E ({xi, xi+1} ∈ E) for all i = 1, . . . , k− 1.
Definition 2.14. A cycle in a directed (undirected) graph G is defined as a node-path from a node
to itself such that all the edges involved in the path are distinct. A cycle in a directed (undirected)
graph is called essential if it involves more than two nodes and it is not a union of two cycles.
Definition 2.15. Let G = 〈X, E〉 be a directed graph and let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y − 1.
Then, G is called a directed (undirected) partial line graph with respect to x, y if G = G1 ∪ G2, where
G1 = 〈X, E1〉 is the directed (undirected) line graph on X and G2 = 〈[x, y], E2〉 is a directed
(undirected) graph such that for all z ∈ {x, y} there is an essential cycle involving the node z.
Definition 2.16. The top-graph of a domain D is defined as the directed graph 〈X, E〉, where
(x, y) ∈ E if and only if there exists a preference P ∈ D such that r1(P) = x and r2(P) = y.
Definition 2.17. An undirected graph G = 〈X, E〉 is called connected if for all x, y ∈ X, there is a
node-path from x to y.
Definition 2.18. An undirected graph G = 〈X, E〉 is called a tree if for every two distinct nodes
x, y ∈ X, there is a unique path from x to y in G. A spanning tree T of an undirected connected
graph G is defined as a connected subgraph of G that is a tree. For an undirected connected graph
G, we denote by TG the set of all spanning trees of G.
7For details, see Weymark (2011).
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3. TOP-CONNECTED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we introduce the notion of top-connected single-peaked domains and characterize
the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains. We begin with a few formal definitions.
Definition 3.1. A domain D satisfies top-connectedness property if for all x, x + 1 ∈ X, there are
preferences P, P′ ∈ D such that r1(P) = r2(P′) = x and r2(P) = r1(P′) = x + 1.
Note that a domain satisfies top-connected property if and only if its top-graph is the directed
line graph on X.
Definition 3.2. A domain Sˆ is called a top-connected single-peaked domain if it is a single-peaked
domain, and it satisfies top-connectedness property.
Note that a top-connected single-peaked domain with m alternatives can be constructed with
2m− 2 preferences. Also, since a maximal single-peaked domain is top-connected single-peaked,
such a domain can contain at most 2m−1 preferences. Thus, the class of top-connected single-
peaked domains is quite big ranging from domains with 2m− 2 preferences to domains with
2m−1 preferences. In what follows, we provide an example of a top-connected single-peaked
domain with five alternatives.
Example 3.1. Let the set of alternatives be X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5.
Then, the domain in Table 1 is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x4 x1 x4 x4 x2 x5 x2 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x1 x4 x5 x5 x5 x2 x1 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x5 x1 x1 x1
Table 1: A top-connected single-peaked domain
In Figure 1, we present the top-graph of the domain in Example 3.1.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
Figure 1: Top-graph of the domain in Example 3.1
3.1 UNANIMOUS AND STRATEGY-PROOF SCFS
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
top-connected single-peaked domains.
Theorem 3.1. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Sˆn → X is unanimous
and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
The proof of the Theorem 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1 (Moulin (1980); Weymark (2011)). Let S¯ be a maximal single-peaked domain. Then, an
SCF f : S¯n → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
3.2 MIN-MAX DOMAINS
In this section, we introduce the notion of min-max domains and provide a characterization of
these domains. A domain is called a min-max domain if the set of unanimous and strategy-proof
SCFs coincides with the set of min-max rules. Below, we provide a formal definition of min-max
domains.
Definition 3.3. A domain D is called a min-max domain if:
(i) every min-max rule on Dn is strategy-proof, and
(ii) every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on Dn is a min-max rule.
Our next theorem provides a characterization of the min-max domains.
Theorem 3.2. A domain D is a min-max domain if and only if D is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
Proof. The proof of the if-part follows from Theorem 3.1. We proceed to prove the only-if part.
Let D be a min-max domain. We show that D is a top-connected single-peaked domain. First,
we show that D is a single-peaked domain. Assume for contradiction that there is Q ∈ D and
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x, y ∈ X such that x < y < r1(Q) and xQy. Consider the min-max rule f β with respect to (βS)S⊆N
such that βS = x for all ∅ ( S ( N. Consider PN ∈ Dn such that P1 = Q and r1(Pi) = y for
all i ∈ N \ 1. By the definition of f β, f β(PN) = y. Consider P′1 ∈ D with r1(P′1) = x. Again, by
the definition of f β, f β(P′1, PN\1) = x. This means agent 1 manipulates at PN via P
′
1, which is a
contradiction to the assumption that D is a min-max domain. Hence, D must be a single-peaked
domain.
Now, we show that D satisfies top-connectedness property. Note that since D is single-peaked,
r1(P) = a (or b) implies r2(P) = a + 1 (or b − 1). Consider some x ∈ X \ {a, b}. Since D is
single-peaked, for all P ∈ D, r1(P) = x implies r2(P) ∈ {x− 1, x + 1}. Without loss of generality,
assume for contradiction to the top-connectedness property that for all P ∈ D, r1(P) = x implies
r2(P) = x− 1. Consider the following SCF8:
f (PN) =

x if r1(P1) = x and xPj(x− 1) for all j ∈ N \ 1,
x− 1 if r1(P1) = x and (x− 1)Pjx for some j ∈ N \ 1,
r1(P1) otherwise.
It is left to the reader to verify that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. We show that f is not
uncompromising, which in turn means that f is not a min-max rule. Let PN ∈ Dn be such that
r1(P1) = x and r1(Pj) = x− 1 for some j 6= 1 and let P′1 ∈ D be such that r1(P′1) = x + 1. Then,
by the definition of f , f (PN) = x − 1 and f (P′1, PN\1) = x + 1. However, this is a violation of
uncompromisingness. This completes the proof of the only-if part. 
3.3 APPLICATIONS
3.3.1 REGULAR SINGLE-CROSSING DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of regular single-crossing domains and provide a
characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains. First, we present
the formal definition of single-crossing domains.
Definition 3.4. A domain D is called a single-crossing domain if there is a linear orderC on D such
8Here D satisfies the unique seconds property defined in Aswal et al. (2003) and the construction of the SCF f is
motivated from the arguments employed in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Aswal et al. (2003).
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that for all x, y ∈ X and all P, Pˆ ∈ D,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy]⇒ xPy.
Definition 3.5. A single-crossing domain S¯c is called maximal if there is no single-crossing domain
D such that S¯c ( D.
In what follows, we provide an example of a maximal regular single-crossing domain with
five alternatives.
Example 3.2. Let the set of alternatives be X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5.
Then, the domain D in Table 2 is a maximal regular single-crossing domain with respect to the
linear order C∈ L(D) given by P1 C P2 C P3 C P4 C P5 C P6 C P7 C P8 C P9 C P10 C P11. To
see this, consider two alternatives, say x2 and x4. Then, x2Px4 for all P ∈ {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6}
and x4Px2 for all P ∈ {P7, P8, P9, P10, P11}. Therefore, x2Pˆx4 for some Pˆ ∈ D implies x2Px4 for all
P C Pˆ.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x1 x4 x4 x4 x2 x5 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x4 x1 x5 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
Table 2: A maximal regular single-crossing domain
In the following lemma, we show that every regular single-crossing domain is single-peaked.
Lemma 3.1. Every regular single-crossing domain Sc is a single-peaked domain.
Proof. Let Sc be a regular single-crossing domain. Let C∈ L(Sc) be such that for all x, y ∈ X and
all P, Pˆ ∈ Sc,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy]⇒ xPy.
We show that each P ∈ Sc is single-peaked. Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction
that there are x, y ∈ X and Q ∈ Sc such that x < y < r1(Q) and xQy. Since x < y and xQy,
by the definition of single-crossing domain, xPy for all P ∈ Sc with P C Q. This, in particular,
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means r1(P) 6= y for all P ∈ Sc with P C Q. Moreover, since y < r1(Q), by the definition of
single-crossing domain, r1(Q)Py for all P ∈ Sc with Q C P. This, in particular, means r1(P) 6= y
for all P ∈ Sc with Q C P. This, together with the fact that r1(Q) 6= y, means r1(P) 6= y for all
P ∈ Sc, which is a contradiction to the regularity of Sc. Therefore, Sc is single-peaked. 
Our next lemma shows that every maximal regular single-crossing domain satisfies top-
connected property.
Lemma 3.2. Every maximal regular single-crossing domain S¯c satisfies top-connectedness property.
Proof. Let S¯c be a maximal regular single-crossing domain. Then, by Lemma 3.1, S¯c is regular
single-peaked. Take x ∈ X \ {a, b}. We show that there exist P, P′ ∈ S¯c such that r1(P) = r2(P′) =
x and r2(P) = r1(P′) = x + 1. Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction that for all
P ∈ S¯c with r1(P) = x, r2(P) 6= x + 1. Because S¯c is single-peaked, it must be that x 6= a and
r2(P) = x− 1 for all P ∈ S¯c with r1(P) = x. Let C∈ L(S¯c) be such that for all x, y ∈ X and all
P, Pˆ ∈ S¯c,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy]⇒ xPy.
Let Pˆ ∈ S¯c be such that r1(Pˆ) = x and for all P ∈ S¯c with Pˆ C P, r1(P) 6= x. Consider the
preference P˜ with r1(P˜) = x and r2(P˜) = x + 1 such that for all x, y ∈ X \ {x, x + 1}, xP˜y if and
only if xPˆy. Clearly, P˜ /∈ S¯c. Since S¯c is single-peaked, it follows that S¯c ∪ P˜ is single-crossing
with respect to the ordering C′∈ L(S¯c ∪ P˜), where C′ is obtained by placing P˜ just after Pˆ in the
ordering C, i.e., for all P, P′ ∈ S¯c, P C′ P′ if and only if P C P′, and for all P ∈ S¯c with Pˆ C P,
Pˆ C′ P˜ C′ P. However, this contradicts the maximality of S¯c, which completes the proof. 
The following corollaries are obtained from Theorem 3.1, Lemma 3.1, and Lemma 3.2. They
characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on the top-connected regular single-crossing
domains and the maximal regular single-crossing domains. Note that a top-connected regular
single-crossing domain with m alternatives can be constructed with 2m− 2 preferences, whereas
a maximal regular single-crossing domain requires m(m− 1)/2 preferences.
Corollary 3.2. Let Sc be a top-connected regular single-crossing domain. Then, an SCF f : Snc → X is
unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
Corollary 3.3. Let S¯c be a maximal regular single-crossing domain. Then, an SCF f : S¯nc → X is
unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
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3.3.2 MINIMALLY RICH SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we present a characterization of unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
minimally rich single-peaked domains. The notion of minimally rich single-peaked domains is
introduced in Peters et al. (2014). For the sake of completeness, we present below the formal
definition of such domains.
Definition 3.6. A single-peaked preference P is called left single-peaked (right single-peaked) if for
all u < r1(P) < v, we have uPv (vPu). Moreover, a single-peaked domain Sm is called minimally
rich if it contains all left and all right single-peaked preferences.
Clearly, a minimally rich single-peaked domain is a top-connected single-peaked domain. So,
we have the following corollary from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.4. Let Sm be a minimally rich single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Snm → X is
unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
3.3.3 DISTANCE BASED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-peaked domains that are based on distances.
Consider the situation where a public facility has to be developed at one of the locations x1, . . . , xm.
Suppose that there is a street connecting the locations, and for every two locations xi and xi+1,
there are two types of distances, a forward distance from xi to xi+1 and a backward distance from
xi+1 to xi. An individual bases her preferences on such distances, i.e., whenever a location is
strictly closer than another to her most preferred location, she prefers the former to the latter.
Moreover, ties are broken on both sides. We show that such a domain is a top-connected single-
peaked domain under some condition on the distances. Below, we present a formal definition of
such domains.
Consider the directed line graph G = 〈X, E〉 on X. A function d : E→ (0,∞) is called a distance
function on G. Given a distance function d, define the distance between two nodes x, y ∈ X as
d(x, y) = d(x, x+ 1) + . . .+ d(y− 1, y) if y > x and d(x, y) = d(x, x− 1) + . . .+ d(y+ 1, y) if y <
x. A distance function satisfies adjacent symmetry if d(x, x + 1) = d(x, x− 1) for all x ∈ X \ {a, b}.
A preference P ∈ L(X) respects a distance function d if for all x, y ∈ X, d(r1(P), x) < d(r1(P), y)
implies xPy. A domain D respects a distance function d if D = {P ∈ L(X) | P respects d}.
Below, we provide an example of a distance based single-peaked domain.
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Example 3.3. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}. The directed line graph G = 〈X, E〉 on X and the
adjacent symmetric distance function d on E are as given below:
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
1
5
5
2
2
3
3
6
Figure 2: The directed line graph G on X and an adjacent symmetric distance function on G
Then, the single-peaked domain based on the distance function d is:
D ={x1x2x3x4x5, x2x3x1x4x5, x2x1x3x4x5, x3x4x2x5x1, x3x2x4x5x1, x4x5x3x2x1,
x4x3x5x2x1, x5x4x3x2x1}.
In the following lemma, we show that a single-peaked domain based on an adjacent symmetric
distance function is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
REMARK 3.1. Let G = 〈X, E〉 be the directed line graph on X and let d : E→ (0,∞) be an adjacent
symmetric distance function. Suppose a domain D respects d. Then, D is a top-connected
single-peaked domain.
The following corollary is obtained from Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.1.
Corollary 3.5. Let G = 〈X, E〉 be the directed line graph on X and let d : E → (0,∞) be an adjacent
symmetric distance function. Suppose a domain D respects d. Then, f : Dn → X is unanimous and
strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
4. PARTIALLY SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we consider a particular class of non-single-peaked domains. These domains
exhibit single-peaked property only over a strict subset of alternatives. We call such domains
partially single-peaked domains which are formally defined below.
Definition 4.1. Let x, y ∈ X such that x < y− 1. Then, a domain S˜ is called partially single-peaked
with respect to x, y if:
(i) for all P ∈ S˜ with r1(P) ∈ [x, y] and all u, v /∈ (x, y),
[
v < u ≤ r1(P) or r1(P) ≤ u < v
]
implies uPv,
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(ii) for all P ∈ S˜ with r1(P) /∈ [x, y] and all u, v ∈ X such that u /∈ (x, y),
[
v < u ≤
r1(P) or r1(P) ≤ u < v
]
implies uPv, and
(iii) there exist Q, Q′ ∈ S˜ with r1(Q) = x and r1(Q′) = y such that either
[
r2(Q) ∈ (x +
1, y) and r2(Q′) ∈ (x, y− 1)
]
or
[
r2(Q) = y and r2(Q′) = x
]
.
Condition (i) in Definition 4.1 implies that if the top alternative of a preference in a partially
single-peaked domain lies in the interval [x, y], then it maintains single-peaked property over
the alternatives in the interval [a, x] and in the interval [y, b]. Note that Condition (i) does not
impose any restriction on the relative ordering of an alternative in [x, y] and an alternative outside
[x, y]. The interpretation of Condition (ii) is as follows. Consider a preference P in a partially
single-peaked domain such that r1(P) /∈ [x, y]. Suppose, for instance, r1(P) ∈ [a, x). Then, P
maintains single-peaked property over the alternatives in the interval [a, r1(P)]. Moreover, if
an alternative u lies in the interval (r1(P), x] or in the interval [y, b], then it is preferred to any
alternative v in the interval (u, b]. Note that if u lies in the interval (r1(P), x], then it is preferred
to an alternative in [x, y]. Thus, Condition (ii) imposes some restriction on the relative ordering
of an alternative in [x, y] and an alternative outside [x, y]. Further, note that Conditions (i) and
(ii) do not impose any restriction on the relative ordering of two alternatives in the interval
[x, y]. Finally, Condition (iii) ensures that the intervals [a, x] and [y, b] are the maximal intervals
over which every preference in a partially single-peaked domain maintains the single-peaked
property. To see this, first note that both Q and Q′ are non-single-peaked preferences. Q violates
single-peakedness for the alternatives x + 1 and r2(Q), and Q′ violates single-peakedness for the
alternatives y− 1 and r2(Q′). Therefore, the intervals [a, x] and [y, b] are the maximal intervals
over which every preference in a partially single-peaked domain maintains the single-peaked
property. In Section 4.2, we show that the particular restrictions on the second ranked alternatives
of Q and Q′ given by Condition (iii) are necessary for our results.
We illustrate the notion of partially single-peaked domains in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) and
Figure 3(b) present a partially single-peaked preference P with r1(P) ∈ [x, y] and r1(P) ∈ [a, x),
respectively. Figure 3(c) presents the partially single-peaked preferences Q and Q′ with r1(Q) = x,
r2(Q) ∈ (x + 1, y), r1(Q′) = y, and r2(Q′) ∈ (x, y− 1) while Figure 3(d) presents partially single-
peaked preferences Q and Q′ with r1(Q) = x, r2(Q) = y, r1(Q′) = y, and r2(Q′) = x. Note that
all these preferences are single-peaked over the intervals [a, x] and [y, b]. Furthermore, for the
preference depicted in Figure 3(a), there is no restriction on the alternatives in the interval (x, y),
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and for that shown in Figure 3(b), there is no restriction on the alternatives in the interval (x, y)
except that x is preferred to all the alternatives in (x, b]. Also, for the preferences in Figures 3(c)
and 3(d), there is no restriction on the alternatives in (x, y) other than the one on the second
ranked alternatives.
a x y br1(P)
(a) Partially single-peaked preference P with r1(P) ∈ [x, y]
a x y br1(P)
(b) Partially single-peaked preference P with r1(P) ∈ [a, x)
a byr1(Q) = x r2(Q) = x′ a bx r1(Q′) = yr2(Q′) = y′
(c) Partially single-peaked preferences Q, Q′ with x + 1 < r2(Q) < y and x < r2(Q′) < y− 1
a br1(Q) = x r2(Q) = y a br1(Q′) = yr2(Q′) = x
(d) Partially single-peaked preferences Q, Q′ with r2(Q) = y and r2(Q′) = x
Figure 3: Partially single-peaked preferences
In the following, we define a top-connected partially single-peaked domain.
Definition 4.2. A domain S˜ is called a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to
alternatives x, y with x < y− 1 if:
(i) S˜ is a partially single-peaked domain with respect to x, y, and
(ii) S˜ contains a top-connected single-peaked domain.
We interpret Definition 4.2 in terms of its top-graph. Let G be the top-graph of a top-connected
partially single-peaked domain with respect to alternatives x and y. Then, G is a directed partial
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line graph with respect to x and y since G = G1 ∪ G2, where G1 = 〈X, E1〉 is the directed line
graph on X and G2 = 〈[x, y], E2〉 is a directed graph such that (x, r2(Q), r2(Q)− 1, . . . , x) is an
essential cycle involving x and (y, r2(Q′), r2(Q′) + 1, . . . , y) is an essential cycle involving y. In
Example 4.1, we present a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with seven alternatives,
and in Figure 4, we present the top-graph of the domain.
Example 4.1. Let the set of alternatives be X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}, where x1 < x2 < x3 <
x4 < x5 < x6 < x7. Then, the domain in Table 3 is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain
with respect to x3 and x6. To see this, first consider a preference with its top alternative in the set
{x3, x4, x5, x6}, say P7. Note that x3P7x2P7x1 and x6P7x7, which means P7 is single-peaked over
the subsets of alternatives {x1, x2, x3} and {x6, x7}. Moreover, the position of x5 is completely
unrestricted (here at the bottom) in P7. Next, consider a preference with the top alternative in
the set {x1, x2, x3}, say P2. Note that P2 is single-peaked over the sets {x1, x2, x3} and {x6, x7}.
Further, note that x3 is preferred to the alternatives x4, x5, x6, x7, and that there is no restriction on
the relative ordering of the alternatives x4 and x5 (here x5P2x4). Finally, consider the preferences
Q and Q′. Since r1(Q) = x3, r2(Q) = x5, r1(Q′) = x6, and r2(Q′) = x4, they satisfy Condition (iii)
in Definition 4.1.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 Q Q′
x1 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x5 x5 x6 x6 x7 x3 x6
x2 x1 x1 x3 x2 x4 x6 x3 x5 x4 x6 x5 x7 x6 x5 x4
x3 x3 x3 x1 x4 x2 x3 x5 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x3
x4 x6 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x6 x3 x3 x4 x4 x6 x7
x5 x5 x5 x5 x6 x6 x1 x6 x1 x7 x2 x2 x3 x3 x1 x2
x6 x7 x6 x6 x7 x1 x7 x1 x6 x2 x7 x7 x2 x2 x7 x1
x7 x4 x7 x7 x1 x7 x5 x7 x7 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x4 x5
Table 3: A top-connected partially single-peaked domain
The top-graph G of the domain in Example 4.1 is given in Figure 4. Note that G = G1 ∪ G2,
where G1 is the directed line graph on {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} and G2 is a directed graph on
{x3, x4, x5, x6} containing two essential cycles (x3, x5, x4, x3) and (x6, x4, x5, x6) involving the
nodes x3 and x6, respectively.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
Figure 4: Top-graph of the Domain in Example 4.1
4.1 UNANIMOUS AND STRATEGY-PROOF SCFS
In this subsection, we characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected
partially single-peaked domains as partly dictatorial generalized median voter schemes. A formal
definition of such SCFs is presented below:
Definition 4.3. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1. Then, a min-max rule f β : Dn → X with
parameters β = (βS)S⊆N is a partly dictatorial generalized median voter scheme (PDGMVS) with
respect to x, y if there exists an agent d ∈ N, called the partial dictator of f β, such that βd ∈ [a, x]
and βN\d ∈ [y, b].
REMARK 4.1. Reffgen (2015) defines PDGMVS in a different fashion but it can be shown that their
definition is equivalent to Definition 4.3.9
The following lemma justifies why the agent d in Definition 4.3 is called the partial dictator.
Lemma 4.1. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let f β : Dn → X be a PDGMVS with respect to
x, y. Let agent d be the partial dictator of f β. Then,
(i) f β(PN) ∈ [a, x] if r1(Pd) ∈ [a, x),
(ii) f β(PN) ∈ [y, b] if r1(Pd) ∈ (y, b], and
(iii) f β(PN) = r1(Pd) if r1(Pd) ∈ [x, y].
Proof. We prove (i) and (iii), the proof of (ii) can be established using symmetric arguments.
Assume for contradiction that r1(Pd) ∈ [a, x) and f β(PN) > x. Since f β is a min-max rule, f β
is uncompromising. Therefore, f β(P′d, PN\d) = f
β(PN), where r1(P′d) = a. By the definition
of f β, we have f β(P′N) ≥ f β(PN), where r1(P′i ) = b for all i 6= d. Because f β(PN) > x, we
have f β(P′N) > x. However, by the definition of f
β, f β(P′N) = βd. Since βd ∈ [a, x], this is a
contradiction. This completes the proof of (i).
9For details see the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Reffgen (2015).
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Now, we prove (iii). Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction that r1(Pd) ∈ [x, y]
and f β(PN) > r1(Pd). Using similar logic as in the proof of (i), we have f β(P′N) ≥ f β(PN), where
r1(P′d) = a and r1(P
′
i ) = b for all i 6= d. Since f β(P′N) = βd ∈ [a, x], this is a contradiction. This
completes the proof of (iii). 
The following theorem characterizes the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected
partially single-peaked domains.
Theorem 4.1. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x, y. Then, an SCF f : S˜n → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is
a PDGMVS with respect to x, y.
The proof of the Theorem 4.1 is relegated to Appendix B.
Our next corollary is a consequence of Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. It characterizes a class of
dictatorial domains, and thereby it generalizes the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Gibbard
(1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) results. Note that our dictatorial result is independent of those in
Aswal et al. (2003), Sato (2010), Pramanik (2015) and so on.
Corollary 4.1. Let D be a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to a and b. Then, D
is a dictatorial domain.
4.2 A RESULT ON PARTIAL NECESSITY
In this subsection, we consider domains for which the set of unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs
coincides with the set of PDGMVS. We call such domains PDGMVS domains. A formal definition
is given below.
Definition 4.4. A domain D is called a PDGMVS domain if there are x, y ∈ X with x < y− 1 such
that:
(i) every PDGMVS with respect to x, y on Dn is strategy-proof, and
(ii) every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on Dn is a PDGMVS with respect to x, y.
Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) in Definition 4.1 are obviously strong conditions. Are they necessary
for PDGMVS domains? The question appears to be extremely difficult to resolve completely.
However, the following lemma shows that Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 4.1 are necessary,
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and the subsequent discussion shows that Condition (iii) is also close to being necessary in an
appropriate sense.
Lemma 4.2. Let D be a PDGMVS domain. Then, D satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 4.1.
Proof. First, we show that D satisfies Condition (i) in Definition 4.1. Without loss of generality,
assume that there exists P˜ ∈ D with r1(P˜) ∈ [x, y] such that uP˜v for some u < v ≤ x. Consider
the PDGMVS f β such that:
βS =

v if S = {1},
x− 1 if {1} ( S,
r1(P1) if 1 /∈ S.
Note that agent 1 is the partial dictator of f β. Consider the preference profile PN ∈ Dn such that
r1(P1) = a, P2 = P˜, and r1(Pj) = b for all j 6= 1, 2. Then, by the definition of f β, f β(PN) = v. Let
P′2 ∈ D be such that r1(P′2) = u. Then, f β(P′2, PN\2) = u. Since uP˜v, agent 2 manipulates at PN via
P′2.
Now, we show that D satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition 4.1. Without loss of generality,
assume for contradiction that there exist P˜ ∈ D with r1(P˜) ∈ [a, x) and u, v ∈ X with u /∈ (x, y)
such that
[
v ≺ u  r1(P) or r1(P)  u ≺ v
]
and vP˜u. If v ∈ [a, x], then using similar argument
as in the proof of the necessity of Condition (i), it follows that there is a PDGMVS on Dn that is
manipulable. So, assume r1(P˜) ≤ u ≤ x < v. Consider the PDGMVS f β : Dn → X such that:
βS =
 u if 1 ∈ S and S 6= N,b if 1 /∈ S and S 6= N.
Let PN ∈ Dn be such that P1 = P˜ and r1(Pj) = b for all j 6= 1. Then, f β(PN) = u. Let P′1 ∈ D be
such that r1(P′1) = b. Then, f
β(P′1, PN\1) = v. Since vP˜u, agent 1 manipulates at PN via P
′
1. 
Coming to Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1, it is to be noted that it can be violated in many
ways, we consider those domains obtained through mild violations of the same and show that
there do exist unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such domains that are not PDGMVS.
Recall that Condition (iii) requires two non-single-peaked preferences Q and Q′ in D such
that r1(Q) = x, r2(Q) = x′, r1(Q′) = y, and r2(Q′) = y′, where either
[
x′ ∈ (x, y− 1) and y′ ∈
(x + 1, y)
]
or
[
x′ = x and y′ = x
]
. Suppose a domain D satisfies Conditions (i) and (ii) in
Definition 4.1. Suppose further that D contains a non-single-peaked preference of the form Q, but
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no preference of the form Q′. In the following example, we construct a two-agent unanimous and
strategy-proof SCF on such a domain D that is not a PDGMVS.
Example 4.2. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3 ≺ x4 ≺ x5. By P = x1x2x3x4x5, we
mean a preference P such that x1Px2Px3Px4Px5. Consider the domain:
D ={x1x2x3x4x5, x1x3x4x5x2, x2x1x3x4x5, x2x3x4x5x1, x3x2x1x4x5, x3x4x5x2x1, x4x3x2x1x5,
x4x5x3x2x1, x5x4x3x2x1}.
Note that D \ {x1x3x4x5x2} is a top-connected single-peaked domain and the preference
x1x3x4x5x2 is of the form Q with x = x1 and x′ = x3. However, there is no preference in D of the
form Q′. In Table 4, we present a two-agent SCF that is unanimous and strategy-proof but not a
PDGMVS.
P1
P2 x1x2x3x4x5 x1x3x4x5x2 x2x1x3x4x5 x2x3x4x5x1 x3x2x1x4x5 x3x4x5x2x1 x4x3x2x1x5 x4x5x3x2x1 x5x4x3x2x1
x1x2x3x4x5 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x1x3x4x5x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x2x1x3x4x5 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x2x3x4x5x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x3x2x1x4x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x3x4x5x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x4x3x2x1x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x4x5x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4
x5x4x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
Table 4: A unanimous and strategy-proof SCF which is not a PDGMVS
It is left to the reader to verify that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. Note that f violates
tops-onlyness at the preference profiles (x3x4x5x2x1, x1x2x3x4x5) and (x3x4x5x2x1, x1x3x4x5x2),
and hence f is not a PDGMVS.
Now, suppose that D contains two non-single-peaked preferences Q and Q′ which do not
satisfy Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1 for their second ranked alternatives. In the following
example, we construct a two-agent unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on such a domain D that
is not a PDGMVS.
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Example 4.3. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3 ≺ x4 ≺ x5. Consider the domain:
D ={x1x2x3x4x5, x1x3x4x5x2, x2x1x3x4x5, x2x3x4x5x1, x3x2x1x4x5, x3x4x5x2x1, x4x3x2x1x5,
x4x5x3x2x1, x5x4x3x2x1, x5x1x4x3x2}.
Let Q = x1x3x4x5x2 and Q′ = x5x1x4x3x2. Note thatD \ {Q, Q′} is a top-connected single-peaked
domain. Further, since r2(Q) = x3 and r2(Q′) = x1, Q and Q′ do not satisfy Condition (iii) in
Definition 4.1. In Table 5, we present a two-agent SCF that is unanimous and strategy-proof but
not a PDGMVS.
P1
P2 x1x2x3x4x5 x1x3x4x5x2 x2x1x3x4x5 x2x3x4x5x1 x3x2x1x4x5 x3x4x5x2x1 x4x3x2x1x5 x4x5x3x2x1 x5x4x3x2x1 x5x1x4x3x2
x1x2x3x4x5 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x1
x1x3x4x5x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x1
x2x1x3x4x5 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x2x3x4x5x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2
x3x2x1x4x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x3x4x5x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3 x3
x4x3x2x1x5 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x4
x4x5x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x4 x4
x5x4x3x2x1 x2 x3 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5
x5x1x4x3x2 x1 x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5 x5
Table 5: A unanimous and strategy-proof SCF which is not a PDGMVS
It is left to the reader to verify that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. Note that f violates
tops-onlyness at the preference profiles (x3x4x5x2x1, x1x2x3x4x5) and (x3x4x5x2x1, x1x3x4x5x2),
and hence f is not a PDGMVS.
4.3 APPLICATIONS
4.3.1 MULTIPLE SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAIN
In this subsection, we consider a well-known class of domains called multiple single-peaked
domains and present a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such
domains. However, before formally defining such domains below we first provide a formal
definition of such domains. First, we define the notion of single-peaked domain with respect to
an arbitrary order over X.
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Definition 4.5. Let≺∈ L(X) be a prior order over X. Then, a preference P ∈ L(X) is single-peaked
with respect to ≺ if for all x, y ∈ X, [x ≺ y  r1(P) or r1(P)  y ≺ x] implies yPx. A domain
S≺ is called a single-peaked domain with respect to ≺ if each preference in it is single-peaked with
respect to ≺, and a domain S¯≺ is called maximal single-peaked with respect to ≺ if it contains all
single-peaked preferences with respect to ≺.
Similarly, one can define the notion of top-connected partially single-peaked domains and
PDGMVS with respect to some prior order ≺ over X. For the sake of completeness, we provide
the formal definitions of these concepts in what follows.
For x, y ∈ X such that x  y, we define the intervals [x, y]≺ = {z ∈ X | x  z  y},
[x, y)≺ = [x, y]≺ \ {y}, (x, y]≺ = [x, y]≺ \ {x}, and (x, y)≺ = [x, y]≺ \ {x, y}. Also, for ≺∈ L(X)
and x ∈ X, by x+≺ and x−≺ we denote the alternatives that appear just after and just before x in
the ordering ≺, respectively. More formally, x+≺ = y if x ≺ y and there does not exist z ∈ X with
x ≺ z ≺ y, and x−≺ = y if y ≺ x and there does not exist z ∈ X with y ≺ z ≺ x.
Definition 4.6. Let ≺∈ L(X) be a prior order over X and let x, y ∈ X be such that x ≺ y−≺. Then,
a domain S˜ is called partially single-peaked with respect to ≺ and x, y if:
(i) for all P ∈ S˜ with r1(P) ∈ [x, y]≺ and all u, v /∈ (x, y)≺,
[
v ≺ u  r1(P) or r1(P)  u ≺ v
]
implies uPv,
(ii) for all P ∈ S˜ with r1(P) /∈ [x, y]≺ and all u, v ∈ X such that u /∈ (x, y)≺,
[
v ≺ u 
r1(P) or r1(P)  u ≺ v
]
implies uPv, and
(iii) there exist Q, Q′ ∈ S˜ with r1(Q) = x and r1(Q′) = y such that either
[
r2(Q) ∈ (x+≺, y)≺
and r2(Q′) ∈ (x, y−≺)≺
]
or
[
r2(Q) = y and r2(Q′) = x
]
.
Definition 4.7. Let ≺∈ L(X) be a prior order over X and let x, y ∈ X be such that x ≺ y−≺. A
domain S˜ is called a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to ≺ and x, y if:
(i) S˜ is a partially single-peaked domain with respect to ≺ and x, y, and
(ii) S˜ contains a top-connected single-peaked domain with respect to ≺.
Definition 4.8. Let ≺∈ L(X) be a prior order over X. Further, let β = (βS)S⊆N be a list of 2n
parameters satisfying: (i) βS ∈ X for all S ⊆ N, (ii) β∅ = max≺ (X), βN = min≺ (X), and (iii) for all
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S ⊆ T, βT  βS. Then, an SCF f β : Dn → X is called a min-max rule with respect to ≺ and β if:
f β(P1, . . . , Pn) = min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}},
where all the minimums and maximums are taken with respect to the prior order ≺.
Definition 4.9. Let x1 ≺ . . . ≺ xm be a prior order over X. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x ≺ y−≺. Then,
a min-max rule f β : Dn → X with parameters (βS)S⊆N is a partly dictatorial generalized median
voter scheme with respect to ≺ and x, y if there exists an agent d ∈ N called the partial dictator of f β
such that βd ∈ [x1, x]≺ and βN\d ∈ [y, xm]≺.
Definition 4.10. Let L = {≺1, . . . ,≺q}, where ≺k∈ L(X) for all k ≤ q be a set of q prior orders
over X. A domain is called a multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L, denoted by SL, if
SL =
⋃
k∈{1,...,q}
S¯≺k , where S¯≺k is the maximal single-peaked domain with respect to the prior
order ≺k. A multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L is called trivial if S¯≺ = S¯≺′ for all
≺,≺′∈ L.
Definition 4.11. Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with respect to a set of
prior orders L. Then, alternatives u, v ∈ X are called break-points of SL if:
(i) for all preferences P ∈ SL, all ≺∈ L, and all c, d ∈ X such that {c, d} ∩ [u, v]≺ = ∅,[
d ≺ c  r1(P) or r1(P)  c ≺ d
]
implies cPd, and
(ii) there exist ≺∈ L and P, P′ ∈ SL such that u ≺ v−≺, r1(P) = u, r2(P) ∈ (u+≺, v]≺, r1(P′) = v,
and r2(P′) ∈ [u, v−≺)≺.
REMARK 4.2. Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with respect to L. Then, the
break-points of SL are unique.10
REMARK 4.3. Let u, v be the break-points of a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain SL and
let≺∈ L. Suppose min≺ (X) = x1 and max≺ (X) = xm. Then, u, v induce the partition {XL, XM, XR}
of X, where XL = [x1, u)≺, XM = [u, v]≺, and XR = (v, xm]≺. Such a partition is called the
maximal common decomposition of X. It can be verified that the maximal decomposition does not
depend on the choice of the prior order ≺∈ L. Reffgen (2015) calls the sets XL, XM, and XR as the
left component, the middle component, and the right component of alternatives respectively.
10The proof of this fact is available upon request.
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In the following, we illustrate the notion of break-points of a non-trivial multiple single-peaked
domain by means of an example.
Example 4.4. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7} be the set of alternatives. Consider the set of
prior orders L = {≺1,≺2,≺3,≺4}, where ≺1= x1x2x3x5x4x6x7, ≺2= x1x2x5x4x3x6x7, ≺3=
x1x2x3x4x5x6x7, and ≺4= x1x2x4x3x5x6x7. Let SL be the multiple single-peaked domain with
respect to L. Clearly, SL is non-trivial since S¯≺1 6= S¯≺2 . We claim u = x2 and v = x6 are the break
points of SL. To see this, note that ≺1, ≺2, ≺3, and ≺4 have same relative orderings over the sets
{x1, x2} and {x6, x7}. Therefore, Condition (i) in Definition 4.1 is satisfied for all P ∈ S¯≺i and all
i = 1, 2, 3, 4. For Condition (ii), consider the prior order ≺2. Then, x2 ≺2 x3 ≺2 x6 and there are
preferences P, P′ ∈ S¯≺2 ⊆ SL such that r1(P) = x2, r2(P) = x5, r1(P′) = x6, and r2(P′) = x3. To
obtain the maximal common decomposition, consider a prior order in L, say ≺1. Then, x2 and x6
induce the maximal common decomposition of X given by XL = {x1}, XM = {x2, x3, x4, x5, x6},
and XR = {x7}. It can be verified that the maximal common decomposition of X does not change
if we consider some prior order in L other than the order ≺1.
REMARK 4.4. Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with break-points u, v and
let ≺∈ L be arbitrary. Then, SL is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to
≺ and u, v.
Corollary 4.2 (Reffgen (2015)). Let SL be a non-trivial multiple single-peaked domain with break-points
u, v and let ≺∈ L be arbitrary. Then, an SCF f : SnL → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if
it is a PDGMVS with respect to ≺ and u, v.
4.3.2 SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS ON GRAPHS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-peaked domains on graphs. All the graphs
considered in this subsection are undirected.
Definition 4.12. Let T = 〈X, E〉 be a tree. A domain is called single-peaked with respect to T,
denoted by DT, if for all P ∈ DT and all distinct x, y ∈ X,
[x ∈ piT(r1(P), y)] =⇒ [xPy].
Definition 4.13. Let G = 〈X, E〉 be a undirected connected graph. A domain is called single-peaked
with respect to G, denoted by DG, if DG = ∪T∈TGDT.
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Note that if T is the undirected line graph on X, then DT is a maximal single-peaked domain.
In our next lemma, we show that if a domain is single-peaked with respect to an undirected
partial line graph, then it is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain.
Lemma 4.3. Let x < y− 1 and let G be an undirected partial line graph with respect to x and y. Then,
DG is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain with respect to x, y.
Proof. Let G be an undirected partial line graph with respect to x, y, where x < y− 1. We show
that DG is a top-connected partially single-peaked domain. Let G = G1 ∪ G2, where G1 = 〈X, E1〉
is the undirected line graph on X and G2 = 〈[x, y], E2〉 is an undirected graph such that for all
z ∈ {x, y} there is a cycle involving z.
First, we show that DG is partially single-peaked. Take P ∈ DG with r1(P) ∈ [x, y] and take
u, v ∈ X \ (x, y). Suppose [v < u ≤ r1(P) or r1(P) ≤ u < v]. Consider an arbitrary spanning
tree T of G. Then, by the definition of G, u ∈ piT(r1(P), v). Therefore, uPv. Using similar
logic, it follows that DG satisfies Condition (ii) in Definition 4.1. Finally, we show that there are
Q, Q′ ∈ DG satisfying Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1. Let C be a cycle in G2 involving the node x.
Then, there must be an edge {x, x′} in C such that x′ ∈ (x + 1, y]. Consider the tree T = 〈X, E〉
such that E = (E1 \ {x, x + 1}) ∪ {x, x′}. Since G1 = 〈X, E1〉 is the undirected line graph on X,
T is a spanning tree of G. Because {x, x′} ∈ E, there is a preference P ∈ DT with r1(P) = x
and r2(P) = x′. Therefore, P satisfies Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1 for Q. Similarly, it can be
shown that there is P′ ∈ DG that satisfies Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1 for Q′. Now, suppose
x′ = y. That means there is an edge in T connecting x and y. Therefore, there is P′ ∈ DT such
that r1(P′) = y and r2(P′) = x. Therefore, P and P′ satisfy the restrictions on the second ranked
alternatives of Q and Q′ given by Condition (iii) in Definition 4.1, respectively.
Now, we show that DG contains a top-connected single-peaked domain. Since G1 is the
undirected line graph on X, DG1 is a top-connected single-peaked domain. Moreover, since G1 is
a spanning tree of G, DG1 ⊆ DG. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.3. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let G = 〈X, E〉 be a undirected partial line
graph with respect to x, y. Suppose DG is the single-peaked domain with respect to G. Then, an SCF
f : DnG → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a PDGMVS.
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5. GROUP STRATEGY-PROOFNESS
In this section, we consider group strategy-proofness and obtain a characterization of the unani-
mous and group strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected single-peaked domains and top-connected
partially single-peaked domains. We begin with the definition of group strategy-proofness.
Definition 5.1. An SCF f : Dn → X is called group manipulable if there is a preference profile PN,
a non-empty coalition C ⊆ N, and a preference profile P′C ∈ D|C| of the agents in C such that
f (P′C, PN\C)Pi f (PN) for all i ∈ C. An SCF f : Dn → X is called group strategy-proof if it is not
group manipulable.
Barbera` et al. (2010) established a sufficient condition that ensures the equivalence of strategy-
proofness and group strategy-proofness on a domain. It can be easily verified that top-connected
single-peaked domains satisfy their sufficient condition. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain. Then, an SCF f : Sˆn → X is unanimous
and group strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
In the following theorem, we present a characterization of the unanimous and group strategy-
proof SCFs on top-connected partially single-peaked domains. It is worth mentioning that these
domains do not satisfy the sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and
group strategy-proofness provided in Barbera` et al. (2010).
Theorem 5.1. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x, y. Then, an SCF f : S˜n → X is unanimous and group strategy-proof if and only
if it is a PDGMVS with respect to x, y.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-peaked
domain with respect to x, y. Suppose f : S˜n → X is a PDGMVS with respect to x, y with partial
dictator d. It is enough to show that f is group strategy-proof. Clearly, no group can manipulate f
at a preference profile PN ∈ S˜n, where r1(Pd) ∈ [x, y]. Consider a preference profile PN ∈ S˜n such
that r1(Pd) ∈ [a, x). We show that f is group strategy-proof at PN. By the definition of PDGMVS,
f (PN) ∈ [a, x]. Let C′ = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) ≤ f (PN)} and C′′ = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) > f (PN)}. Suppose
a coalition C manipulates f at PN. Then, there is P′C ∈ S˜ |C| such that f (P′C, PN\C)Pi f (PN) for all
i ∈ C. If f (P′C, PN\C) < f (PN), then by the definition of S˜ , we have C ∩ C′′ = ∅. However, by
27
the definition of PDGMVS, f (P′C, PN\C) ≥ f (PN) for all C ⊆ C′ and all P′C ∈ S˜ |C|, a contradiction.
Again, if f (P′C, PN\C) > f (PN), then by the definition of S˜ , we have C ∩ C′ = ∅. However, by the
definition of PDGMVS, f (P′C, PN\C) ≤ f (PN) for all C ⊆ C′′ and all P′C ∈ S˜ |C|, a contradiction.
The proof for the case where r1(Pd) ∈ (y, b] follows from symmetric argument. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a class of restricted domains which we call top-connected
single-peaked domains and have characterized the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such
domains as min-max rules. Outstanding examples of top-connected single-peaked domains are
maximal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally rich single-peaked
domains (Peters et al. (2014)), distance based single-peaked domains, and regular single-crossing
domains (Saporiti (2009)). Further, we have introduced the notion of min-max domains, for which
the set of unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs coincides with the set of min-max rules. We show
that a domain is a min-max domain if and only if it is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
Next, we have considered domains that violate single-peaked property over a subset of
alternatives. We call such domains top-connected partially single-peaked domains. For such
a domain, there are two alternatives x, y with x < y− 1 such that the domain satisfies single-
peaked property over [a, x] and [y, b], and violate the property over (x, y). We have shown that
an SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on such a domain if and only if it is a PDGMVS with
respect to x, y. We have also shown that the top-connected partially single-peaked domains
includes almost all domains with the property that the set of unanimous and strategy-proof
SCFs coincides with the set of PDGMVS. Outstanding examples of top-connected partially single-
peaked domains are multiple single-peaked domains (Reffgen (2015)) and single-peaked domains
on graphs. Our result on partial necessity shows that top-connected partially single-peaked
domains are the minimal subsets of a multiple single-peaked domain such that every unanimous
and strategy-proof SCF is a PDGMVS.
Finally, we have considered group strategy-proofness. It follows from Barbera` et al. (2010) that
strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent on top-connected single-peaked
domains. However, their result does not apply on top-connected partially single-peaked domains.
In this paper, we have shown that strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness are equivalent
on these domains, and in particular, we have provided a characterization of unanimous and
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group strategy-proof SCFs on such domains.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Proof. (If-part) Suppose f : Sˆn → X is a min-max rule. Then, f is unanimous and strategy-
proof on the maximal single-peaked domain (Weymark (2011)). Since every top-connected
single-peaked domain is a subset of the maximal single-peaked domain, f is unanimous and
strategy-proof on Sˆn.
(Only-if part) Let f : Sˆn → X be a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF. We show that f is a
min-max rule. In what follows, we establish a few properties of f in the following sequence of
lemmas.
In the following lemma, we show that the outcome of f at every preference profile PN ∈ Sˆn
must lie in-between min(τ(PN)) and max(τ(PN)).
Lemma A.1. It must be that f (PN) ∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))] for all PN ∈ Sˆn.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that f (PN) /∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))] for some PN ∈ Sˆn. With-
out loss of generality, assume that f (PN) = x < min(τ(PN)). Then, f (PN) = x < x + 1 ≤
min(τ(PN)) ≤ r1(Pi) for all i ∈ N. Since Pi is single-peaked, this means (x + 1)Pix for all
i ∈ N. For each i ∈ N, consider P′i ∈ Sˆ such that r1(P′i ) = x + 1 and r2(P′i ) = x. Then,
by strategy-proofness, f (P′i , PN\i) = x. By moving the agents i ∈ N from the preference
Pi to the preference P′i one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have
f (PN) = f (P′1, PN\1) = f (P
′
1, P
′
2, PN\{1,2}) = . . . = f (P′1, . . . , P
′
n−1, Pn) = x. However, by una-
nimity, f (P′1, . . . , P
′
n) = x + 1. This means agent n manipulates at (P′1, . . . , P
′
n−1, Pn) via P
′
n, a
contradiction. This completes the proof. 
Our next lemma and its corollary establish a restricted version of uncompromisingness. The
implication of the lemma is as follows. Consider a preference profile PN . Fix an alternative y ∈ X.
Construct another preference profile P′N where each agent with top-ranked alternatives at PN on
the left (right) of y move to a preference with top-ranked alternative y, while all other agents keep
their preferences unchanged. Then, (i) if f (PN) was on the right (left) of y, then f (P′N) = f (PN),
and (ii) if f (PN) was on the left (right) of y, then f (P′N) = y.
Lemma A.2. Let PN, P′N ∈ Sˆn and y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N, if r1(Pi) < y then r1(P′i ) = y,
otherwise Pi = P′i . Then, f (P
′
N) = max{ f (PN), y}.
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Proof. Suppose f (PN) = x. Suppose further that y ≤ x. Note that if y ≤ min(PN), then
P′N = PN, and hence, by Lemma A.1, y ≤ f (PN). Therefore, there is nothing to prove. Suppose
min(PN) < y. Let i ∈ N be such that r1(Pi) = min(PN). Take P′i ∈ Sˆ such that r1(P′i ) =
y. We show that f (P′i , PN\i) = x. Suppose f (P
′
i , PN\i) > x. Since P
′
i is single-peaked and
r1(P′i ) ≤ x < f (P′i , PN\i), it must be that xP′i f (P′i , PN\i). This means agent i manipulates at
(P′i , PN\i) via Pi, a contradiction. Now suppose f (P
′
i , PN\i) < x. Since r1(Pi) < r1(P
′
i ), we have
min(PN) ≤ min(P′i , PN\i). Because r1(Pi) = min(PN) and min(PN) ≤ min(P′i , PN\i), by Lemma
A.1, it must be that r1(Pi) ≤ f (P′i , PN\i). Since Pi is single-peaked and r1(Pi) ≤ f (P′i , PN\i) < x,
it follows that f (P′i , PN\i)Pix. This means agent i manipulates at PN via P
′
i , a contradiction.
Therefore, f (P′i , PN\i) = x. Now, if y ≤ min(P′i , PN\i), then by the condition of the lemma,
P′N = (P
′
i , PN\i), and the proof is complete. Suppose min(P
′
i , PN\i) < y. Consider j ∈ N such
that r1(Pj) = min(P′i , PN\i). Let P
′
j be such that r1(P
′
j ) = y. Using similar argument as before, it
follows that f (P′i , P
′
j , PN\{i,j}) = f (P
′
i , PN\i) = f (PN). Continuing in this manner, it follows that
f (P′N) = f (PN). This completes the proof of the lemma for y ≤ x.
Now, suppose y > x. Let y = x + k for some positive integer k. Let PˆN ∈ Sˆn be such that
r1(Pˆi) = x for all i ∈ N with r1(Pi) ≤ x and Pˆi = Pi for all other agents. By strategy-proofness,
f (PˆN) = x. Let Nx = {i ∈ N | r1(Pˆi) = x}. Suppose P¯ ∈ Sˆ is such that r1(P¯) = x + 1 and
r2(P¯) = x. Take i ∈ Nx and let P¯i = P¯. Then, by strategy-proofness, f (P¯i, PˆN\i) ∈ {x, x + 1} as
otherwise agent i manipulates at (P¯i, PˆN\i) via Pˆi. Using similar argument, f (P¯i, P¯j, PˆN\{i,j}) ∈
{x, x + 1}, where i, j ∈ Nx and P¯j = P¯. Continuing in this manner, we have f (P¯N) ∈ {x, x + 1},
where P¯i = P¯ for all i ∈ Nx and P¯i = Pˆi for all i ∈ N \ Nx. However, min(P¯N) = x + 1. Hence,
by Lemma A.1, f (P¯N) = x + 1. Suppose Nx+1 = {i ∈ N | r1(P¯i) = x + 1}. Let P˜ ∈ Sˆ be such
that r1(P˜) = x + 2 and r2(P˜) = x + 1. Further, let P˜N ∈ Sˆn be such that P˜i = P˜ if i ∈ Nx+1
and P˜i = P¯i otherwise. Then, by using arguments similar to the above, we have f (P˜N) = x + 2.
Continuing in this manner, we have f (P′′N) = x + k, where P
′′
N ∈ Sˆn is such that for all i ∈ N, if
r1(Pi) < y then r1(P′′i ) = y and r2(P
′′
i ) = y− 1, otherwise Pi = P′′i . By strategy-proofness, this
means f (P′N) = x + k, which completes the proof of the lemma for y > x. 
Corollary A.1. Let PN, P′N ∈ Sˆn and y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N, if r1(Pi) > y then r1(P′i ) = y,
otherwise Pi = P′i . Then, f (P
′
N) = min{ f (PN), y}.
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Our next lemma shows that f is uncompromising.11
Lemma A.3. The SCF f is uncompromising.
Proof. Let PN ∈ Sˆn, i ∈ N, and P′i ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P′i ) ≤ f (PN). It is
sufficient to show f (P′i , PN\i) = f (PN). Suppose f (PN) = x, r1(Pi) = y, and r1(P
′
i ) = y
′. Assume
for contradiction that f (P′i , PN\i) = x
′ 6= x. By strategy-proofness, it must be that x′ < y as
otherwise agent i manipulates either at PN via P′i or at (P
′
i , PN\i) via Pi. Consider P¯N ∈ Sˆn such
that r1(P¯j) = y for all j ∈ N with r1(Pj) ≤ y, and P¯j = Pj for all other agents. Since f (PN) = x,
by Lemma A.2, we have f (P¯N) = max{x, y} = x. On the other hand, since f (P′i , PN\i) = x′, by
Lemma A.2, we have f (P¯N) = max{x′, y} = y, a contradiction. This completes the proof of the
lemma. 
The following lemma establishes that f is a min-max rule.
Lemma A.4. The SCF f is a min-max rule.
Proof. For all S ⊆ N, let (PaS , PbN\S) ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(Pai ) = a for all i ∈ S and r1(Pbi ) = b for
all i ∈ N \ S. Define βS = f (PaS , PbN\S) for all S ⊆ N. Clearly, βS ∈ X for all S ⊆ N. By unanimity,
β∅ = b and βN = a. Also, by uncompromisingness, βS ≤ βT for all T ⊆ S.
Take PN ∈ Sˆn. We show f (PN) = min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}}. Suppose S1 = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) <
f (PN)}, S2 = {i ∈ N | f (PN) < r1(Pi)}, and S3 = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) = f (PN)}. By uncompro-
misingness, βS1∪S3 ≤ f (PN) ≤ βS1 . Now, consider the expression minS⊆N{maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS}}. Take
S ⊆ S1. Then, by Condition (iii) in Definition 2.11, βS1 ≤ βS. Since r1(Pi) < f (PN) for all i ∈ S and
f (PN) ≤ βS1 ≤ βS, we have maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS} = βS. Similarly, for all S ⊆ N such that S ∩ S2 6= ∅,
we have max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS} > f (PN). Consider S ⊆ N such that S ∩ S2 = ∅ and S ∩ S3 6= ∅.
Then, S ⊆ S1 ∪ S3, and hence, βS1∪S3 ≤ βS. Therefore, maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS} = max{ f (PN), βS} ≥
max{ f (PN), βS1∪S3}. Since βS1∪S3 ≤ f (PN), we have max{ f (PN), βS1∪S3} = f (PN). Combining
all these, we have min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}} = min{βS1 , f (PN)}. Because f (PN) ≤ βS1 , we have
min{βS1 , f (PN)} = f (PN). This completes the proof. 
The proof of the only-if part of Theorem 3.1 follows from Lemmas A.1 - A.4. 
11Since every SCF satisfying uncompromisingness is tops-only, Lemma A.3 shows that a top-connected single-
peaked domain is a tops-only domain. It can be easily verified that top-connected single-peaked domains fail to
satisfy the sufficient conditions for a domain to be tops-only identified in Chatterji and Sen (2011) and Chatterji and
Zeng (2015).
31
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. (If-part) Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let f β be a PDGMVS on S˜n with respect
to x, y. Then, f β is unanimous by definition. We show that f β is strategy-proof. Let d be the
partial dictator of f β. Since f β(PN) = r1(Pd) whenever r1(Pd) ∈ [x, y], f β cannot be manipulated
at a preference profile PN ∈ S˜n, where r1(Pd) ∈ [x, y]. Take PN ∈ S˜n such that r1(Pd) ∈ [a, x).
Then, by Lemma 4.1, f β(PN) ∈ [a, x]. Take i ∈ N such that r1(Pi) ≤ f β(PN). By the definition of
f β, f β(P′i , PN\i) ≥ f β(PN) for all P′i ∈ S˜ . Since f β(PN) ≤ x, by the definition of partially single-
peaked domain, r1(Pi) ≤ f β(PN) means f β(PN)Piz for all z > f β(PN). Therefore, agent i cannot
manipulate f β at PN. By symmetric argument, it follows that agent i cannot manipulate f β at a
preference profile where r1(Pi) ≥ f β(PN). Using similar logic, it follows that f β is strategy-proof
when r1(Pd) ∈ (y, b]. This completes the proof of the if-part.
(Only-if part) Let x, y ∈ X be such that x < y− 1 and let S˜ be a top-connected partially single-
peaked domain with respect to x, y. Suppose f : S˜n → X is a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF.
We show that f is a PDGMVS with respect to x, y. Let Sˆ be a top-connected single-peaked domain
contained in S˜ . Such a domain must exist by Definition 4.2. By Theorem 3.1, f restricted to Sˆn
must be a min-max rule. We establish a few properties of f in the following sequence of lemmas.
Our next lemma shows that f satisfies tops-onlyness for a particular type of preference profiles.
It says the following. Let c be an arbitrary alternative. Consider a preference profile PN where
each Pi is single-peaked with the top alternative either x or c. Construct another preference
profile P′N where some agents with top alternatives x change their preferences (possibly to a
non-single-peaked preference) keeping x at the top, while all other agents keep their preferences
unchanged. Suppose the outcome of f at PN is c. Then, the outcome of f at P′N must be c.
Lemma B.1. Let ∅ ( S ( N and let c ∈ X. Suppose (PS, PN\S) ∈ Sˆn and (P′S, PN\S) ∈ S˜n are two
tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = x for all i ∈ S, and r1(Pj) = c for all j ∈ N \ S.
Then, f (PS, PN\S) = c implies f (P′S, PN\S) = c.
Proof. Take S such that ∅ ( S ( N. We prove the lemma using induction on |c− x|. By unanimity,
the lemma holds for c = x. Suppose the lemma holds for all c such that |c− x| ≤ k. We prove
the lemma for all c such that |c− x| = k + 1. Take c such that |c− x| = k + 1. Let (PS, PN\S) ∈ Sˆn
and (P′S, PN\S) ∈ S˜n be two tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = x for all i ∈ S,
and r1(Pj) = c for all j ∈ N \ S. Suppose f (PS, PN\S) = c. We show f (P′S, PN\S) = c. We show
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this for x < c, the proof for the case x > c is similar. Since x < c and |c − x| = k + 1, we
have c = x + k + 1. Let (PS, PˆN\S) ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(Pˆj) = x + k and r2(Pˆj) = x + k + 1
for all j ∈ N \ S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PN\S) = x + k + 1, we have
f (PS, PˆN\S) = x+ k. Since (PS, PˆN\S) and (P′S, PˆN\S) are tops-equivalent and r1(Pˆj) = x+ k for all
j ∈ N \ S, we have by the induction hypothesis f (P′S, PˆN\S) = x + k. For all j ∈ N \ S, let P¯j ∈ Sˆ
be such that r1(P¯j) = x + k + 1 and r2(P¯j) = x + k. Since f (P′S, PˆN\S) = x + k, by moving the
agents j ∈ N \ S from Pˆj to P¯j one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have
f (P′S, P¯N\S) ∈ {x + k, x + k + 1}. We claim f (P′S, P¯N\S) = x + k + 1. Assume for contradiction
that f (P′S, P¯N\S) = x + k. Recall that Pi ∈ Sˆ for all i ∈ S. Since (x + k)Pi(x + k + 1) for all
i ∈ S, by moving the agents i ∈ S from P′i to Pi one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness
at every step, we have f (PS, P¯N\S) ≤ x + k. Since r1(Pj) = r1(P¯j) = x + k + 1 for all j ∈ N \ S,
by strategy-proofness, we have f (PS, PN\S) 6= x + k + 1. This contradicts our assumption that
f (PS, PN\S) = x + k + 1. Therefore, f (P′S, P¯N\S) = x + k + 1. Since r1(Pj) = r1(P¯j) = x + k + 1
for all j ∈ N \ S, we have by strategy-proofness, f (P′S, PN\S) = x + k + 1. This completes the
proof. 
Corollary B.1. Let ∅ ( S ( N and let c ∈ X. Suppose (PS, PN\S) ∈ Sˆn and (P′S, PN\S) ∈ S˜n are two
tops-equivalent preference profiles such that r1(Pi) = y for all i ∈ S, and r1(Pj) = c for all j ∈ N \ S.
Then, f (PS, PN\S) = c implies f (P′S, PN\S) = c.
Our next lemma shows that the outcome of f at a boundary preference profile cannot be strictly
in-between x and y.12
Lemma B.2. Let PN ∈ S˜n be such that r1(Pi) ∈ {a, b} for all i ∈ N. Then, f (PN) /∈ (x, y).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that f (PN) = z ∈ (x, y) for some PN ∈ S˜n such that r1(Pi) ∈
{a, b} for all i ∈ N. Let S = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) = a}. Then, it must be that ∅ ( S ( N as otherwise
we are done by unanimity. Let r2(Q) = x′ and r2(Q′) = y′, where Q, Q′ ∈ S˜ are as given in
Condition (iii) of Definition 4.1. We distinguish a few cases based on the relative positions of x′,
y′, and z.
CASE 1. Suppose x′ ∈ (x + 1, y− 1), y′ ∈ (x + 1, y− 1), and z ∈ (x, y′] ∪ [x′, y). We consider
the case where z ∈ (x, y′], the proof for the case where z ∈ [x′, y) follows from symmetric
argument. Let P′N ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(P′i ) = y′ for all i ∈ S and r1(P′j ) = y − 1 for all
12A boundary preference profile is one where the top alternative of each agent is either a or b.
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j ∈ N \ S and let PˆN ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(Pˆi) = x for all i ∈ S and r1(Pˆj) = x + 1 for all
j ∈ N \ S. Suppose that for all j ∈ N \ S, r2(P′j ) = y. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and
f (PS, PN\S) = z, we have f (P′S, P
′
N\S) = y
′ and f (PˆS, PˆN\S) = x + 1. As f (PˆS, PˆN\S) = x + 1, by
Lemma B.1, we have f (QS, PˆN\S) = x + 1, where Qi = Q for all i ∈ S. Consider the preference
profile (Q′S, P
′
N\S), where Q
′
i = Q
′ for all i ∈ S. Note that f (P′S, P′N\S) = y′, r1(Q′) = y, and
r2(Q′) = y′. Therefore, by moving the agents i ∈ S from P′i to Q′ one-by-one and using strategy-
proofness at every step, we have f (Q′S, P
′
N\S) ∈ {y, y′}. We claim f (Q′S, P′N\S) = y. Assume
for contradiction that f (Q′S, P
′
N\S) = y
′. Since yP′j y
′ for all j ∈ N \ S, by moving the agents
j ∈ N \ S from P′j to Q′ one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have
f (Q′S, Q
′
N\S) 6= y. However, this contradicts unanimity. So, f (Q′S, P′N\S) = y. For all i ∈ S, let
P˜i ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(P˜i) = y. By strategy-proofness, f (P˜S, P′N\S) = y. Since f is a min-max
rule on Sˆn, this means f (P˜S, PˆN\S) = y. For all i ∈ S, let P˜′i ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(P˜′i ) = x′.
Because (P˜S, PˆN\S), (P˜′S, PˆN\S) ∈ Sˆn and f is a min-max rule on Sˆn, f (P˜S, PˆN\S) = y implies
f (P˜′S, PˆN\S) = x
′. Note that f (P˜′S, PˆN\S) = x
′, r1(Q) = x, and r2(Q) = x. Therefore, by moving
agents i ∈ S from P˜′i to Q one-by-one and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have
f (QS, PˆN\S) ∈ {x, x′}. However, {x+ 1} ∩ {x, x′} = ∅ by our assumption. This is a contradiction
to our earlier finding that f (QS, PˆN\S) = x + 1. This completes the proof for Case 1.
CASE 2. Suppose x′ ∈ (x + 1, y− 1), y′ ∈ (x + 1, y− 1), y′ < x′ − 1, and z ∈ (y′, x′). Let P′N ∈ Sˆn
be such that r1(P′i ) = x
′ for all i ∈ S and r1(P′j ) = y for all j ∈ N \ S and let PˆN ∈ Sˆn be such that
r1(Pˆi) = x for all i ∈ S and r1(Pˆj) = y′ for all j ∈ N \ S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and
f (PS, PN\S) = z, we have f (P′S, P
′
N\S) = x
′ and f (PˆS, PˆN\S) = y′. As f (PˆS, PˆN\S) = y′, by Lemma
B.1, we have f (QS, PˆN\S) = y′, where Qi = Q for all i ∈ S. Again, as f (P′S, P′N\S) = x′, by Lemma
B.1, we have f (P′S, Q
′
N\S) = x
′, where Q′i = Q
′ for all j ∈ N \ S. Note that f (QS, PˆN\S) = y′,
r1(Q′) = y, and r2(Q′) = y′. Therefore, by moving agents j ∈ N \ S from Pˆj to Q′ one-by-one
and using strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (QS, Q′N\S) ∈ {y, y′}. Further, note that
f (P′S, Q
′
N\S) = x
′, r1(Q) = x, and r2(Q) = x′. So, by moving agents i ∈ S from P′i to Q one-by-one
and using strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (QS, Q′N\S) ∈ {x, x′}. However, by our
assumption {x, x′} ∩ {y, y′} = ∅, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof for Case 2.
CASE 3. Suppose x′ = y, y′ = x, and z ∈ (y′, x′). Let P′N ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(P′i ) = x for all i ∈ S
and r1(P′j ) = y for all j ∈ N \ S. Because f is a min-max rule on Sˆn and f (PS, PN\S) = z, we have
f (P′S, P
′
N\S) = z. Take i ∈ N and consider the preference profile (Qi, P′S\i, P′N\S), where Qi = Q.
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Since r1(P′i ) = r1(Qi) = x and f (P
′
S, P
′
N\S) 6= x, by strategy-proofness, f (Qi, P′S\i, P′N\S) 6= x.
Continuing in this manner, it follows that f (QS, P′N\S) 6= x, where Qi = Q for all i ∈ S. Moreover,
since r2(Qi) = y for all i ∈ S and r1(P′j ) = y for all j ∈ N \ S, by unanimity and strategy-proofness,
f (QS, P′N\S) ∈ {x, y}. Since f (QS, P′N\S) 6= x, this means f (QS, P′N\S) = y. Let Q′j = Q′ for all
j ∈ N \ S. As f (QS, P′N\S) = y and r1(Q′) = y, by strategy-proofness, f (QS, Q′N\S) = y. Now, if
we first move the agents j ∈ N \ S from P′j to Q′ and then move the agents i ∈ S from P′i to Q,
then it follows from similar logic that f (QS, Q′N\S) = x. Since x 6= y, this is a contradiction to our
earlier finding that f (QS, Q′N\S) = y. This completes the proof for Case 3, and hence, the proof of
the lemma. 
Let (βS)S⊆N be the parameters of f restricted to Sˆn. In Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, we establish
a few properties of these parameters.
Lemma B.3. For all S ⊆ N, βS ∈ [a, x] if and only if βN\S ∈ [y, b].
Proof. Take S ⊆ N. It is enough to show that βS ∈ [a, x] implies βN\S ∈ [y, b]. Assume for
contradiction that βS, βN\S ∈ [a, x]. Let Q′ ∈ S˜ with r1(Q′) = y be as given in Condition (iii)
of Definition 4.1. Suppose r2(Q′) = y′. Take z ∈ (y′, y). Let (PS, PN\S) ∈ Sˆn be such that
r1(Pi) = a for all i ∈ S and r1(Pj) = b for all j ∈ N \ S. Since f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule,
f (PS, PN\S) = βS ∈ [a, x]. Let (P′S, P′N\S) ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(P′i ) = y′ for all i ∈ S and r1(P′j ) = z
for all j ∈ N \ S. Since f (PS, PN\S) ∈ [a, x], by uncompromisingness of f restricted to Sˆn, we have
f (P′S, P
′
N\S) = y
′. Because r1(Q′) = y and r2(Q′) = y′, by moving the agents i ∈ S one-by-one
from P′i to Q
′ and applying strategy-proofness at every step, we have f (Q′S, P
′
N\S) ∈ {y, y′},
where Q′i = Q
′ for all i ∈ S.
Now, let (P¯S, P¯N\S) ∈ Sˆn be such that r1(P¯i) = b for all i ∈ S and r1(P¯j) = a for all j ∈ N \ S.
Again, since f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule, f (P¯S, P¯N\S) = βN\S ∈ [a, x]. Recall that
for j ∈ N \ S, P′j ∈ Sˆ with r1(P′j ) = z. Consider (P′′S , P′N\S) ∈ Sˆn such that r1(P′′i ) = y for
all i ∈ S. Since f (P¯S, P¯N\S) ∈ [a, x], by uncompromisingness of f restricted to Sˆn, we have
f (P′′S , P
′
N\S) = z. Because r1(P
′′
i ) = y = r1(Q
′) for all i ∈ S, by Lemma B.1, it follows that
f (Q′S, P
′
N\S) = z. However, as z /∈ {y, y′}, this is a contradiction to our earlier finding that
f (Q′S, P
′
N\S) ∈ {y, y′}. 
The following lemma says that there is exactly one agent i such that βi ∈ [a, x].
Lemma B.4. It must be that |{i ∈ N | βi ∈ [a, x]}| = 1.
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Proof. Suppose there are i 6= j ∈ N such that βi, β j ∈ [a, x]. By Lemma B.3, βi ∈ [a, x] implies
βN\i ∈ [y, b]. Since j ∈ N \ i and βT ≤ βS for all S ⊆ T, βN\i ∈ [y, b] implies β j ∈ [y, b], a
contradiction. Hence, there can be at most one agent i ∈ N such that βi ∈ [a, x].
Suppose βi ∈ [y, b] for all i ∈ N. By Lemma B.3, this means βN\i ∈ [a, x] for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, there must be S ⊆ N such that βS ∈ [a, x] and for all S′ ( S, βS′ ∈ [y, b]. By unanimity,
S 6= ∅. If S is singleton, say i for some i ∈ N, then βi ∈ [a, x] and we are done. So assume that
there are j 6= k ∈ S.
Consider the preference profile PN ∈ Sˆn such that r1(Pi) = x for all i ∈ S \ j, r1(Pj) = x + 1,
r2(Pj) = x, and r1(Pi) = x′ for all i /∈ S. Since βS ∈ [a, x] and βS′ ∈ [y, b] for all S′ ( S, it follows
from the definition of min-max rule that f (PN) = x + 1. Let P′k ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(P′k) = x′.
Since βS\k ∈ [y, b] and f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule, it follows that f (P′k, PN\k) = x′.
Consider the preference profile (Qk, PN\k), where Qk = Q. Note that f (P′k, PN\k) = x
′, r1(Qk) = x,
and r2(Qk) = x′. Therefore, by strategy-proofness, we have f (Qk, PN\k) ∈ {x, x′}. Suppose
f (Qk, PN\k) = x. Because f (PN) = x + 1 and r1(Pk) = x, this means agent k manipulates at PN
via Qk. So, f (Qk, PN\k) = x′. Let P′j ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(P′j ) = x. Since βS ∈ [a, x] and x is the
top-ranked alternative of the agents in S at preference profile (P′j , PN\j), we have f (P
′
j , PN\j) = x.
As r1(Pk) = r1(Qk) = x, this means f (P′j , Qk, PN\{j,k}) = x. Note that f (Qk, PN\k) = x
′, r1(Pj) =
x + 1, and r2(Pj) = x. Hence, agent j manipulates at (Qk, PN\{k}) via P′j . This completes the proof
of the lemma. 
REMARK B.1. By Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, it follows that f restricted to Sˆn is a PDGMVS.
Our next lemma establishes that f is uncompromising.13 First, we introduce few notations
that we use in the proof of the lemma. For PN ∈ S˜n, let N˜(PN) = {i ∈ N | Pi /∈ Sˆ} be the
set of agents who do not have single-peaked preferences at PN. Moreover, for 0 ≤ l ≤ n, let
S˜nl = {PN ∈ S˜n | |N˜(PN)| ≤ l} be the set of preference profiles where at most l agents have
non-single-peaked preferences. Note that S˜n0 = Sˆn and S˜nn = S˜n.
Lemma B.5. The SCF f is uncompromising.
Proof. Since S˜n0 = Sˆn, f restricted to S˜n0 is uncompromising. Suppose f restricted to S˜nk is
uncompromising for some k < n. We show that f restricted to S˜nk+1 is uncompromising. It is
13Since every SCF satisfying uncompromisingness is tops-only, Lemma B.5 shows that a top-connected partially
single-peaked domain is a tops-only domain. As in the case of Lemma A.3, it can be easily verified that top-connected
partially single-peaked domains fail to satisfy the sufficient conditions for a domain to be tops-only identified in
Chatterji and Sen (2011) and Chatterji and Zeng (2015).
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enough to show that f restricted to S˜nk+1 is tops-only. To see this, note that if f restricted to S˜nk+1
is tops-only, then f is uniquely determined on S˜nk+1 by its outcomes on Sˆn. Therefore, since f
restricted to Sˆn is uncompromising, f is uncompromising on S˜nk+1.
Take PN ∈ S˜nk+1 and j ∈ N˜(PN). Let Pˆj ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(Pˆj) = r1(Pj). Then, PN and (Pˆj, PN\j)
are tops-equivalent and (Pˆj, PN\j) ∈ S˜nk . It is sufficient to show that f (PN) = f (Pˆj, PN\j). Assume
for contradiction that f (PN) 6= f (Pˆj, PN\j). Assume without loss of generality that the partial
dictator of f restricted to Sˆn is agent 1. By the induction hypothesis, agent 1 is the partial dictator
of f restricted to S˜nk , i.e., for all PN ∈ S˜nk , if r1(P1) ∈ [a, x) then f (PN) ∈ [a, x], if r1(P1) ∈ (y, b]
then f (PN) ∈ [y, b], and if r1(P1) ∈ [x, y] then f (PN) = r1(P1). We distinguish a few cases based
on the position of the top-ranked alternative of agent 1.
CASE 1. Suppose r1(P1) ∈ [a, x) ∪ (y, b]. We consider the case where r1(P1) ∈ [a, x) as the proof
for the case where r1(P1) ∈ (y, b] follows from symmetric arguments. Since r1(P1) ∈ [a, x),
we have f (Pˆj, PN\j) ∈ [a, x]. Because Pˆj is single-peaked, if f (Pˆj, PN\j) < f (PN) ≤ r1(Pˆj) or
r1(Pˆj) ≤ f (PN) < f (Pˆj, PN\j), then agent j manipulates at (Pˆj, PN\j) via Pj. Moreover, since
f (Pˆj, PN\j) ∈ [a, x], if f (PN) < f (Pˆj, PN\j) ≤ r1(Pˆj) or r1(Pj) ≤ f (Pˆj, PN\j) < f (PN), then by the
definition of top-connected partially single-peaked domain, agent j manipulates at (Pj, PN\j) via
Pˆj. Now, suppose f (Pˆj, PN\j) < r1(Pˆj) < f (PN). Let P¯j ∈ Sˆ be such that r1(P¯j) = f (PN). Since
f restricted to S˜nk is uncompromising and f (Pˆj, PN\j) < r1(Pˆj) < r1(P¯j), we have f (P¯j, PN\j) =
f (Pˆj, PN\j). Because r1(P¯j) = f (PN), it follows that agent j manipulates at (P¯j, PN\j) via Pj. Using
similar logic, it can be shown that f (PN) < r1(Pˆj) < f (Pˆj, PN\j) leads to a manipulation by agent
j. Therefore, we have f (PN) = f (Pˆj, PN\j) when r1(P1) ∈ [a, x).
CASE 2. Suppose r1(P1) ∈ [x, y]. This means f (Pˆj, PN\j) = r1(P1). Consider P¯j ∈ Sˆ such that
r1(P¯j) = f (PN). Since (P¯j, PN\j) ∈ S˜nk , by the induction hypothesis, we have f (P¯j, PN\j) = r1(P1).
Because r1(P¯j) = f (PN) and f (P¯j, PN\j) = r1(P1) 6= f (PN), agent j manipulates at (P¯j, PN\j) via
Pj. Therefore, f (PN) = f (Pˆj, PN\j) when r1(P1) ∈ [x, y].
This completes the proof of the lemma by induction. 
Now, we complete the proof of the only-if part of Theorem 4.1. Since f is uncompromising on
S˜n and f restricted to Sˆn is a min-max rule with parameters (βS)S⊆N satisfying the properties as
stated in Lemma B.3 and Lemma B.4, it follows that f is a PDGMVS. 
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